




DELAWARE DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES:   
THE FOCUS ON LOYALTY 
Randy J. Holland* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The University of Pennsylvania has had an illustrious reputation ever 
since it was founded in 1749 by Benjamin Franklin1 and the Law School 
was established in 1850 by Professor George Sharswood.2  As I prepared 
for my lecture today, however, I was keenly aware that the first lectures in 
the law delivered at the University of Pennsylvania were in 1790.3  Those 
law lectures were presented by James Wilson, a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence and a Justice on the first United States Supreme Court.4  In 
fact, Wilson’s views on the law were presented in lectures to President 
George Washington and the members of his Cabinet.5 
Penn’s tradition of academic excellence continues.  The Institute for 
Law and Economics (the “Institute”)6 is a good example.  For more than 
twenty-five years it has demonstrated the benefits of a cross-disciplinary 
perspective.  As Dean Michael Fitts has stated, the Institute “combines 
Penn’s greatest strengths in the Law School, the Wharton School, and the 
Department of Economics to focus on complex questions that concern all 
 * Randy J. Holland is a Justice on the Supreme Court of Delaware.  This is the 2008 
Distinguished Jurist Lecture that he presented for the Institute for Law and Economics at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law on November 11, 2008. 
 1. Timeline of University History, University Archives and Records Center, 
University of Pennsylvania, available at 
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/histy/genlhistory/timeline.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
 2. History of the Law School, University Archives and Records Center, University of 
Pennsylvania, available at http://www.archives.upenn.edu/histy/features/schools/law.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law & Economics, 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (describing 
the Institute). 
  
676 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
of these fields.”7  Two of the great strengths in the Law School are the co-
directors of the Institute, Professors Edward B. Rock and Michael L. 
Wachter.  I congratulate them on the Institute’s remarkable achievements 
and thank them for honoring me with the invitation to speak today. 
Ed Rock is not only one of the most respected professors of corporate 
law in the United States but he has a well-deserved international reputation.  
More than a decade ago, he wrote a brilliant law review article entitled 
Saints and Sinners:  How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?8  He 
concluded that Delaware fiduciary law is best understood as a set of 
parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors.  According to 
Professor Rock, the tales that are told in the Delaware judicial opinions 
collectively describe the role of directors. 
I must admit that when I first read the title, I thought Professor Rock 
would cast the Delaware judiciary in the role of “saints” with the litigants 
playing the “sinners.”  In that article, Professor Rock concludes that the 
Delaware judges on the Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are good 
storytellers and notwithstanding “the fact specific, narrative quality of 
Delaware judicial opinions, over time [those decisions] yield reasonably 
determinative guidelines.”9 
In reaching that conclusion, Professor Rock successfully asks, 
analyzes, and answers several questions, including what he describes as 
“the mushiness of Delaware fiduciary duty case law.”10  Because I 
graduated from this law school, I immediately recognized “mushiness” as a 
sophisticated legal term of art.  Consequently, just like a law student 
writing an exam answer, I knew I could not leave the title of my speech 
with a mushy reference to fiduciary duty.  So, I amended the title to include 
a “focus on loyalty.”  In my remarks this afternoon, I will briefly describe 
why loyalty is now the central theme in the Delaware judiciary’s stories or 
opinions about the fiduciary duties of directors. 
I am sure that when most of you think of legal stories, the opinions by 
the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are not foremost in 
your mind.  Instead, you may think of literature about the law such as To 
Kill a Mockingbird,11 Twelve Angry Men,12 The Caine Mutiny13 or novels 
 7. INSTITUTE FOR LAW & ECONOMICS, 2006-2007 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2007), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/AnnualReports/2006-
2007AnnualReport.pdf. 
 8. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:  How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). 
 9. Id. at 1017. 
 10. Id. at 1101. 
 11. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1960) (telling the story 
of a lawyer from a small town in Alabama who decides to defend an unpopular client). 
 12. REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN, A PLAY IN THREE ACTS (Dramatic Publ’g. 
Co. 1955) (portraying the story of a dissenting juror in a murder trial). 
  




by John Grisham.14  You may also think of movies such as A Civil 
Action,15 Kramer vs. Kramer16 or perhaps, given the topic of my remarks, 
Wall Street17 with Michael Douglas as Gordon Ge
You may also think of Shakespeare because Shakespeare often 
referred to the law in his plays.  The persuasiveness of legal references by 
Shakespeare is understandable.  London was home to the four Inns of 
Court.  They were the institutions that trained trial lawyers—known in 
England as barristers. 
Many historians contend that Shakespeare had extensive contact with 
the legal world of London.  Seven of Shakespeare’s plays were performed 
at the Inns of Court.18  The Merchant of Venice19 and Measure for 
Measure20 were Shakespeare’s two primarily “legal” plays.  From a legal 
perspective, there are parallel themes in both plays:  the tension between 
justice and the letter of the law.  In the end, both plays temper a strictly 
legalistic approach with equitable principles.  We all remember that 
Shylock was entitled to his pound of flesh—as long as he did not draw any 
blood.21 
The Merchant of Venice is often viewed as dramatizing the struggle of 
the Court of Chancery in England for the supremacy of its equity 
jurisdiction.22  Interestingly, the Delaware Constitution of 1792 created a 
separate court of equity that still exists.23  The equitable struggles described 
by Shakespeare are relevant today because the Delaware Court of Chancery 
has been vested with all of the historic equitable powers that were extant in 
 13. HERMAN WOUK, THE CAINE MUTINY, A NOVEL OF WORLD WAR II (Doubleday 
1952) (detailing the story of a naval captain who is discharged by his executive officer). 
 14. See generally John Grisham, Author Spotlight, Random House, Inc. Academic 
Resources, http://www.randomhouse.com/acmart/catalog/ 
author.pperl?authorid=11178&view=full_sptlght (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (outlining John 
Grisham’s career as an author). 
 15. A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998) (relaying the story of families that filed 
suit against two companies that dumped toxic waste and caused their children’s deaths). 
 16. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979) (telling the story of a divorced man 
who must fight in court for the custody of his child). 
 17. WALL STREET (Amercent Films 1987) (depicting the story of a young stock broker 
and his ordeal with illegal insider trading). 
 18. See DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS?  SHAKESPEARE’S LEGAL APPEAL 
13-15 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (explaining the role of the law in Shakespeare’s works). 
 19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (telling the story of a merchant 
who must default on his loan for his friend’s love). 
 20. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE (portraying the story of the Duke 
of Vienna’s absence that left the strict Angelo in charge). 
 21. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, supra note 19, at act 4, sc. 1. 
 22. KORNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 65-66 (discussing the legal references in 
Shakespeare’s book, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE). 
 23. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 1. 
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England’s Court of Chancery prior to the American Revolutionary War.24  
The Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court have 
repeatedly tempered a strictly legalistic approach with equitable principles.  
As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Schnell v. Chris-Craft 
Industries—“inequitable action does not become permissible simply 
because it is legally possible.”25 
“One of the fundamental tenets of Delaware corporate law provides 
for a separation of control and ownership.”26  What has been called a 
“cardinal precept” of the Delaware General Corporation Law’s statutory 
scheme is the provision in section 141(a) that “directors, rather than 
shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”27  
Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states in pertinent 
part: 
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under 
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter 
or in its certificate of incorporation.28 
For more than a century, Delaware courts have tempered law with 
equity by recognizing that the directors’ exercise of this statutory power to 
manage “carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the 
corporation and its shareholders.”29  “An underlying premise for the 
imposition of fiduciary duties is a separation of legal control from 
beneficial ownership.”30  Equitable principles act in those circumstances to 
protect the stockholder beneficiaries who are not in a position to directly 
manage the corporation for themselves. 
It should come as no surprise that the fiduciary duties of directors of 
Delaware corporations are an equitable response to the power that is 
conferred upon directors as a matter of statutory law.  It should also come 
as no surprise that those equitable fiduciary duty precepts date back to a 
decision by the Lord Chancellor of England in 1742.  In Charitable Corp. 
v. Sutton, the Lord Chancellor explained that corporate directors were both 
agents and trustees required to act with “fidelity and reasonable 
 24. See RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION:  A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 133-35 (Greenwood Press 2002) (discussing the jurisdiction and decision process of 
the Court of Chancery); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) 
(explaining that the Delaware Court of Chancery has the right to determine fair value during 
appraisal under § 262). 
 25. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
 26. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998). 
 27. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141(a) (2008) (stating same). 
 28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 29. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)). 
 30. Malone, 722 A.2d at 9. 
  
2009] FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND LOYALTY 679 
 
 
diligence.”31  Ever since the Sutton decision, courts have consistently stated 
that directors of corporations are fiduciaries who must comply with the 
duties of care (described as reasonable diligence in the Sutton decision) and 
loyalty (described as fidelity in Sutton).32 
II. BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
Corporate litigation usually involves a shareholder challenge to a 
board of directors’ business decision.  Shareholder lawsuits frequently seek 
monetary damages for financial harm that was allegedly caused by the 
directors’ actions.  “Stockholders can enforce directors’ fiduciary duties 
through either a direct suit on behalf of that stockholder, where there is 
damage personal to that stockholder, or through a derivative suit to enforce 
the directors’ duties on behalf of the corporation.”33 
Delaware courts are aware that shareholder investments will only be 
maximized if disinterested directors carefully act in good faith to assess the 
relative risks and rewards of business matters.34  Delaware courts also 
recognize, however, that boards of directors would never pursue a rational 
but risky business strategy, in an effort to increase shareholder wealth, if 
financial failure would automatically result in their own personal monetary 
liability.35 
It is inevitable that some business decisions will not result in financial 
success, even though the directors properly discharged all of their fiduciary 
duties.36  That brings me to the business judgment rule.  The business 
judgment rule seeks to promote the full and free exercise of the statutory 
managerial power granted to Delaware directors while at the same time 
protecting the legitimate expectation of shareholder investors.37 
The business judgment rule also traces its origins to the 1742 decision 
of the Lord Chancellor in Charitable Corp. v. Sutton.38  In that decision, 
 31. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742); see 
also Marcia M. McMurray, A Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of 
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 605 nn.1-2 (1987) 
(explaining Charitable Corp. v. Sutton’s description of directors as both agents and trustees). 
 32. Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Director and Officer Liability, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 417, 419-20 (1996). 
 33. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a 
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 400 (2007) 
(citing DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1). 
 34. Randy J. Holland, An Introduction to Delaware Corporation Law Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties, 19 CIV. & COM. L.J. 92, 97 (2008) (Taiwan). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (describing 
the business judgment rule as a standard to review director decisions). 
 38. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742). 
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the Lord Chancellor of England expressed the court’s reluctance to second 
guess the business decisions of corporate directors and articulated what is 
considered to be the first pronouncement of the business judgment rule.39  
The Lord Chancellor wrote: 
[Directors] are most properly agents to those who employ them 
in this trust, and who empower them to direct and superintend the 
affairs of the corporation.  In this respect they may be guilty of 
acts of commission or omission, of mal-feasance or non-
feasance.  Now where acts are executed within their authority, . . 
. though attended with bad consequences, it will be very difficult 
to determine that these are breaches of trust.  For it is by no 
means just in a judge, after bad consequences have arisen from 
such executions of their power, to say that they foresaw at the 
time what must necessarily happen; and therefore were guilty of 
a breach of trust.40 
Delaware amended its Constitution in 1897 to permit incorporation 
under general law and enacted the General Corporation statute in 1899.  
The Delaware Court of Chancery began to adjudicate disputes involving 
the internal affairs of corporations incorporated in Delaware.41  Because the 
Chancellor—as opposed to a jury—would hear and resolve disputes before 
the Court of Chancery, a body of case law began to develop as the 
Chancellor wrote opinions explaining his reasoning.42 
The idea that directors of Delaware corporations owed fiduciary duties 
to the stockholders was probably first expressed in Bodell v. General Gas 
& Electric Corp., a 1926 decision of the Court of Chancery that was 
affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court.43  Chancellor James L. Wolcott 
wrote that “[t]here is no rule better settled in the law of corporations than 
that directors in their conduct of the corporation stand in the situation of 
 39. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE:  FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 9 (5th ed. 1998 & Supp. 
2002). 
 40. Sutton, 2 Atk. at 405, 26 Eng. Rep. at 644 (citations omitted). 
 41. Donald F. Parsons Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware’s Business 
Courts:  Their Rise to Preeminence, BUS. L. TODAY, March/April 2008, at 21, 22 
(describing the role of the Delaware Court of Chancery). 
 42. Id. at 22.  The position of Chancellor was established in the Delaware Constitution 
of 1792.  The Chancellor remained the sole judge of the Court of Chancery under the 
Delaware Constitution of 1897.  In 1939, the Delaware legislature created the position of 
vice chancellor.  Today, there is one Chancellor and there are four vice chancellors.  Id. at 
21-22. 
 43. See generally Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff’d, 
140 A.2d 264 (Del. 1927) (recognizing that directors owed a fiduciary duty to the 
stockholders); see also Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the 
Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 981-82 (1994) (detailing the 
evolution of director fiduciary duty). 
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fiduciaries” and, while “not trustees in the strict sense of the term, . . . they 
have often been described as such” for convenience.44 
In 1931, building on Bodell, the Court of Chancery “articulated what it 
considered the elemental requirements for invoking the Delaware business 
judgment rule—good faith and a ‘bona fide[]’ purpose.”45  In Cole v. 
National Cash Credit Ass’n, Chancellor Wolcott stated that “[t]here is a 
presumption that the judgment of the governing body of a corporation . . . 
is formed in good faith and inspired by a bona fide[] purpose.”46  The court 
explained the underlying premise of the rule by referencing Professor 
Thompson’s textbook Works on Corporations, which used language similar 
to the 1742 decision in Sutton: 
Courts of equity . . . cannot be called upon to control the 
discretion of the managing bodies of corporations; otherwise, 
they would be choked with applications of recalcitrant 
stockholders.  The action of a board of directors may be ill-
advised or apparently unprofitable, but this furnishes no ground 
for invoking the restraining powers of the court.47 
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court refined the business judgment 
rule in what is now a seminal case—Aronson v. Lewis.48  In Aronson, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule “is a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”49  A 
hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the board if the latter’s decision “can be attributed to 
any rational business purpose.”50 
The directors of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary 
relationship not only to the stockholders, but also to the corporations upon 
whose boards they serve.  The directors’ fiduciary responsibilities to both 
the corporation and its shareholders have frequently been described as a 
“triad”:  due care, loyalty, and good faith.51 
 44. Bodell, 132 A. at 446. 
 45. Horsey, supra note 43, at 984 (citing Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183, 
188 (Del. Ch. 1931)). 
 46. Cole, 156 A. at 188; see also Horsey, supra note 43, at 984. 
 47. Cole, 156 A.2d at 188 (quoting Donald v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 48 A.2d 786, 
788 (N.J. Ch. 1901), rev’d, 48 A.2d 771 (N.J. 1901)); see also Horsey, supra note 43, at 
984-85. 
 48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 49. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. 
Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A.2d 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924) 
(reaffirming the view in Aronson). 
 50. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 51. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“good faith may be described 
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“The business judgment rule ‘operates as both a procedural guide for 
litigants and as a substantive rule of law.’”52  “As a procedural guide, the 
business judgment presumption is a rule of evidence that places the initial 
burden of proof on the plaintiff.”53  To rebut the presumptive applicability 
of the business judgment rule, a shareholder plaintiff has the burden of 
proving that the board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, 
violated one of its fiduciary responsibilities:  due care, loyalty, or good 
faith.54 
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the 
business judgment rule operates to provide substantive protection for the 
directors and for the decisions that they have made.55  “If a plaintiff 
successfully rebuts the business judgment rule, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant directors to prove that the transaction was fair to the 
stockholders.”56  The directors must show that “the transaction was the 
product of fair dealing and fair price.”57 
Although the fiduciary duties of a Delaware director are unremitting, 
the exact course of conduct that must be followed to properly discharge 
their responsibilities “will change in the specific context of the action the 
director is taking with regard to either the corporation or its 
shareholders.”58  To understand the fiduciary duties of directors today, in 
particular, the focus on loyalty, we must examine the evolution of 
Delaware’s jurisprudence regarding directors’ responsibilities to act with 
colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and 
loyalty”); see also Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance Standards:  A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 
701, 742 (2008) (“A modern understanding of Delaware director fiduciary duties normally 
begins with the Delaware Supreme Court’s view in the 1993 Cede case . . . that collectively 
treated good faith, loyalty, and due care as the ‘triads’ of fiduciary duty”) (citing Cede & 
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993). 
 52. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (emphasis 
omitted) (citing Cede, 634 A.2d at 360; Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 
1374 (Del. 1995)). 
 53. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162 (emphasis omitted). 
 54. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. 
 55. If the presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted, however, the burden 
shifts to the director defendants to prove that the challenged transaction was “entirely fair” 
to the shareholder plaintiffs.  Burden shifting does not create per se or automatic liability on 
the part of the directors.  An initial judicial determination that a given breach of a board’s 
fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the business judgment rule does not 
preclude a subsequent judicial determination that the board of directors’ action was entirely 
fair.  See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361  (stating “[i]f the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact 
the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.”  (citing Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1377 (Del. 1993)). 
 56. Grossman, supra note 33, at 401 (citing Cede, 634 A.2d at 361). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (1998). 
  




care, loyalty, and good faith.  We will do that by reviewing several well-
known Delaware corporate decisions or s
A. Duty of Loyalty 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty as a concept in Delaware corporation law 
has been traced back to Guth v. Loft, in which the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that “[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their 
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.”59  The 
duty of loyalty is premised on the idea that directors are fiduciaries who 
have a “quasi-trustee and agency relationship” to the corporation and its 
stockholders.60  In Guth v. Loft, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized: 
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a 
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has 
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, 
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of 
his duty[; he or she does this] affirmatively to protect the interests 
of the corporation committed to his [or her] charge . . . .61 
The importance of focusing on the fiduciary duty of loyalty was made 
clear in Aronson when the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the 
protections of the business judgment rule “can only be claimed by 
disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business 
judgment.”62  From the standpoint of interest, Aronson held that “directors 
can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any 
personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to 
a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders 
generally.”63  Accordingly, Aronson held that “if such director interest is 
 59. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 
196, 206 (Del. 2008) (stating same). 
 60. Schoon, 953 A.2d at 206 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 
1357 (Del. 1985)). 
 61. Id. (quoting Guth, 5 A.2d at 510). 
 62. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 63. Id. (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); David J. 
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968)); Cheff v. Mathes, 
199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (stating that a contract 
or transaction between a corporation and a director or officer, or between a corporation and 
any other corporation in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors or 
officers, or have a financial interest, is not void solely because of this reason, or solely 
because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or 
committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such 
director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose, if:  (1) the material facts as to the 
director’s or officer’s relationship or interest are disclosed to or known by the authorizing 
body (the board, a committee, or the shareholders), and (2) the authorizing body in good 
faith authorizes the contract or transaction by a majority of the disinterested members, or (3) 
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present, and the transaction is not approved by a majority consisting of the 
disinterested directors, then the business judgment rule has no 
application.”64 
The pronouncements in the 1984 Aronson opinion were completely 
consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1983 decision the year 
before in Weinberger v. UOP.65  Weinberger is a decision about a 
corporation, Signal, which was the majority shareholder of a subsidiary, 
UOP.66  Signal eliminated UOP’s minority shareholders by a cash-out 
merger.67  The antagonists in that story were directors named Charles S. 
Arledge and Andrew J. Chitiea who sat on the boards of both Signal and 
UOP.68  Chitiea and Arledge did a valuation report for the benefit of the 
parent, Signal.69  That report was never disclosed to either the UOP 
directors or minority shareholders prior to their approval of the merger at a 
lower price.70 
Since the study was prepared by two UOP directors, Chitiea and 
Arledge, using UOP information for the exclusive benefit of Signal and 
nothing was done to disclose the report to the outside UOP directors or the 
minority shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court had to decide if there 
was a breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Weinberger by quoting the 
classic language of Guth v. Loft, which the court stated required no 
embellishment:  “The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty 
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and 
self-interest.”71  The Delaware Supreme Court then concluded that “[g]iven 
the absence of any attempt to structure this [merger] transaction on an 
arm’s length basis, Signal [could not] escape the effects of the conflicts it 
faced, particularly when its designees on UOP’s board [i.e., Chitiea and 
Arledge] did not totally abstain from participation in the matter.”72 
In Weinberger, the Supreme Court held “[t]here is no ‘safe harbor’ for 
such divided loyalties in Delaware.  When directors of a Delaware 
corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to 
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent 
if the contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized by the 
relevant body). 
 64. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 65. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 66. Id. at 702-03. 
 67. Id. at 703. 
 68. Id. at 705. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 707. 
 71. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939)). 
 72. Id. 
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fairness of the bargain.”73  The Supreme Court further held that “[t]he 
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands 
on both sides of a transaction, he [or she] has the burden of establishing its 
entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”74 
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court also stated unequivocally 
that: 
There is no dilution of this obligation where one holds dual or 
multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context.  Thus, 
individuals who act in a dual capacity as directors of two 
corporations, one of whom is parent and the other subsidiary, 
owe the same duty of good management to both corporations, 
and in the absence of an independent negotiating structure or the 
directors’ total abstention from any participation in the matter, 
this duty is to be exercised in light of what is best for both 
companies.75 
The Supreme Court’s reference in Weinberger to an independent 
negotiating structure was highlighted in footnote 7.  In that now famous 
footnote, the Delaware Supreme Court stated “the result here could have 
been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating 
committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm’s length.”76  
For the last twenty-five years, the Delaware courts have emphasized the 
importance of independent directors in safeguarding the interests of 
shareholders by preserving the integrity of the corporate governance 
process. 
The takeover era of the 1980s gave rise to a good example.  In Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed two 
fundamental questions.77  First, did the board of directors have the power 
and duty to oppose a takeover threat that it reasonably perceived to be 
harmful to the corporate enterprise?  Second, was such action entitled to the 
protection of the business judgment rule?  The Supreme Court answered 
both questions in the affirmative.78  The court concluded: 
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an 
obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests 
of the corporation and its shareholders.  In that respect a board’s 
 73. Id. (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (Del. 1952)). 
 74. Id. (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952); 
Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff’d, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 
1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968)). 
 75. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11 (internal citations omitted) (citing Levien v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 915 (Del. Ch. 1969); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 
492 (Del. 1966)). 
 76. Id. at 709 n.7. 
 77. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 78. Id. at 958. 
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duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and 
its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they 
otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment.79 
The Delaware Supreme Court continued its analysis in Unocal by 
explaining that there are “certain caveats to a proper exercise of this 
function.”80  The court stated that there is an “omnipresent specter that a 
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”81  Therefore, “there is an enhanced duty 
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections 
of the business judgment rule may be conferred” upon directors.82 
Accordingly, in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court created a 
procedural paradigm shift in Delaware corporate law.  The court held that 
before the business judgment rule applies to the adoption of a defensive 
mechanism, the initial burden will be on the directors rather than the 
shareholders.  First, the “directors must show that they had reasonable 
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
existed.”83  Directors “satisfy that burden ‘by showing good faith and 
reasonable investigation.’”84  Second, the directors must show that the 
defensive mechanism was “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”85  
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that proof is materially enhanced 
where a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside 
independent directors.86 
Unocal is a significant decision for many reasons.  For our purposes, 
however, two are important.  First, Unocal caused the procedural paradigm 
shift and introduced the concept of enhanced judicial scrutiny prior to 
applying the business judgment rule because of loyalty concerns.  Most 
importantly, those loyalty concerns were non-financial—that is, the 
personal self-interest of directors who may want to entrench themselves in 
office.  Second, Unocal once again focused on independent directors as the 
guardians of the board’s decision-making process. 
Since Unocal, in other contexts, Delaware courts pay particular 
 79. Id. at 954; see also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(stating “[b]ecause the rule presumes that business judgment was exercised, the plaintiff 
must make a showing from which a factfinder might infer that impermissible motives 
predominated in the making of the decision in question,” and explaining that a plaintiff’s 
claim that the directors’ motive was to retain control of the corporation is not sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule). 
 80. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)). 
 84. Id. (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
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attention and give weight to decisions made by directors who are found to 
be independent.  This has been noted in the demand context: 
In derivative litigation, before initiating an action a shareholder 
must first demand that the board of directors bring suit on behalf 
of the corporation.  If the shareholder alleges sufficient facts to 
create a reasonable doubt that the majority of the directors are 
Independent, he [or she] is entitled to proceed with the litigation 
without making any demand, as this would be considered futile. . 
. .  When a shareholder makes a [pre-suit] demand, instead of 
deciding on its own whether to comply, the board may delegate 
to a special committee of Independent Directors the task of 
evaluating the appropriate course of action.87 
Interestingly, despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s emphasis on the 
importance of independent directors, the Delaware General Corporation 
statute does not refer to independent directors.88  That statute addresses 
only the “narrower concept of ‘interested directors.’”89  Accordingly, in 
Delaware, we find that the characteristics of directorial independence are 
ascertained solely from judicial opinions.90 
It has frequently been noted that, although director interest and 
director independence are methods of challenging a director’s loyalty, the 
difference between interest and independence is significant.91  “A director 
is interested in a given transaction if she stands to gain monetarily from it 
in a way that other shareholders do not.”92  The Delaware courts have 
developed independence, however, to be more encompassing than mere 
financial interest.93  Independence “examines whether a director, although 
lacking in a financial self-interest, is somehow [connected] to an individual 
who is interested, or whose decisions are not based on the corporate merits, 
but rather are influenced by ‘personal or extraneous considerations.’”94 
In determining independence, the judicial inquiry goes beyond the 
strict type of financial ties that make a director interested.95  Instead, in 
 87. Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent Director of 
Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 315, 321-22 (2005). 
 88. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 465 
(2008) (“[I]t may be surprising to note that the Delaware General Corporation Law . . . does 
not contain a single reference to independent directors.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 466 (citing William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism 
of the American Corporate Governance System:  Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents 
of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 997-98 (2003)). 
 92. Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Rodrigues, supra note 88, at 466 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993)). 
 95. Id. 
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examining challenges to a director’s independence, “Delaware courts 
broaden the inquiry” into the more subjective types of ties that can generate 
what has been called “a sense of ‘beholdenness.’”96  Three cases provide 
illustrative examples:  Martha Stewart,97 Biondi v. Scrushy,98 and Oracle.99 
In the Martha Stewart derivative litigation, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that independence is a fact-specific determination and that 
Delaware courts must make that determination by answering two inquiries:  
“independent from whom and independent for what purpose?”100  To show 
lack of independence, a shareholder-plaintiff’s complaint must raise a 
reasonable doubt about a director’s independence by alleging that a director 
is so “‘beholden’ to the interested director that his or her discretion would 
be sterilized.”101 
In the Martha Stewart case, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court 
of Chancery’s conclusion that the plaintiff must plead facts that would 
support an inference that because of the nature of the relationships, the non-
interested directors would risk their own reputations rather than their 
relationship with the interested director.102  In the Martha Stewart appeal, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held “[a]llegations that Stewart and the other 
directors moved in the same social circles, attended the same weddings, 
developed business relationships before joining the board, and described 
each other as ‘friends’” were insufficient, without more, to support a 
reasonable inference that a majority of the Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia board was not independent.103  The dismissal of that derivative 
complaint was affirmed.104 
Biondi v. Scrushy105 was a derivative action involving the HealthSouth 
Corporation scandals.  The HealthSouth board’s special litigation 
committee moved to dismiss the suit, which alleged that executives sold 
shares of HealthSouth’s stock while they were in possession of material 
non-public information and thereby injured the company.106  The special 
litigation committee initially consisted of two directors who were closely 
tied to the CEO Richard M. Scrushy, the target of many of the allegations 
 96. Id. 
 97. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 
(Del. 2004). 
 98. Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 99. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 100. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049-50. 
 101. Id. at 1050. 
 102. Id. at 1052. 
 103. Id. at 1051. 
 104. Id. at 1057. 
 105. Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 106. Id. at 1149. 
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made in the complaint.107 
HealthSouth Director Jon Hanson was the Chairman of the National 
Football Foundation and College Hall of Fame, Inc. (“NFFCHF”) and 
Director Larry D. Striplin was on NFFCHF’s board.  Scrushy was also on 
the NFFCHF board.  “HealthSouth had been an important donor to the 
NFFCHF while Hanson was its chair.”108  In addition, “Striplin and 
Scrushy had longstanding personal ties to each other and to college football 
in Alabama, where one college has a Scrushy-Striplin field.”109  
Consequently, the alleged independence of the HealthSouth board’s special 
litigation committee did not survive judicial scrutiny by the Court of 
Chancery in light of the relationship the committee members had with the 
insiders who allegedly engaged in wrongdoing.110 
Later that same year, the Court of Chancery declined to accept the 
recommendation of a special litigation committee in In re Oracle Corp. 
Derivative Litigation.111  I am sure that many of you noticed that as a loyal 
alumnus I am wearing a University of Pennsylvania necktie.  The Oracle 
litigation involved different types of ties to a different university. 
In Oracle, the Court of Chancery did not question whether the 
members of the special litigation committee had acted in good faith and 
diligently conducted their investigation.112  Because the independence 
inquiry in the derivative litigation context asks a different question, 
“whether a director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of making a 
decision with only the best interests of the corporation in mind,” the Court 
of Chancery held that the committee failed to satisfy the test for 
independence.113 
The Oracle special litigation committee consisted of only two 
members, both of whom were professors at Stanford University.  The 
derivative action was brought against “another Stanford professor with 
professional ties to one of the committee members, a Stanford alumnus 
who had directed millions of dollars in contributions to Stanford and served 
on a Stanford advisory board with one of the committee members, and 
Larry Ellison, the CEO, who had donated millions of dollars to 
Stanford.”114  Vice Chancellor Strine, another graduate of the Law School 
 107. Id. at 1156-57. 
 108. Paula J. Dalley, The Business Judgment Rule:  What You Thought You Knew, 60 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 24, 28 (2006). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 948 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 112. Id. at 947. 
 113. Id. at 920 (quoting Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 
1232 (Del. Ch. 2001), rev’d in part on other grounds, 817 A.2d 149 (Del. 2002) (internal 
quotes omitted)); see also Dalley, supra note 108, at 28 (stating same). 
 114. Dalley, supra note 108, at 28. 
  




here at Penn, wrote in Oracle: 
It is no easy task to decide whether to accuse a fellow director of 
insider trading.  For Oracle to compound that difficulty by 
requiring [special litigation committee] members to consider 
accusing a fellow professor and two large benefactors of their 
university of conduct that is rightly considered a violation of 
criminal law was unnecessary and inconsistent with the concept 
of independence recognized by our law.  The possibility that 
these extraneous considerations biased the inquiry of the [special 
litigation committee] is too substantial for this court to ignore.115 
In both Biondi and Oracle, the Court of Chancery relied upon non-
pecuniary bases for finding a lack of independence and addressed the 
effects that relationships, both social and professional, can have on 
directors’ decision-making processes.116  Such considerations are now 
frequently raised to challenge director independence in connection with 
whether demand is excused in a derivative suit or whether a board decision 
should be protected by the business judgment rule.117  The extent to which 
personal relationships compromise director independence is now an 
important loyalty issue that is continuing to develop in Delaware fiduciary 
duty law.118 
B. Duty of Care 
I am going to return to the duty of loyalty, but before I do, I want to 
review what has happened to the duty of care.  To receive the business 
judgment rule’s presumptive protection, directors must inform themselves 
of all material information and then act with care.119  In Delaware, the 
applicable standard of care is gross negligence.120  Interestingly, in the 
1742 Sutton decision, the Lord Chancellor determined that the directors of 
the Charitable Corp. had failed to monitor the corporation’s loan 
procedures in making unsecured loans to directors.121  He held the directors 
liable for the resulting losses after concluding that their actions constituted 
gross negligence.122
 115. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 921. 
 116. Dalley, supra note 108, at 29. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 
1040, 1055 n.44 (Del. 2004) (citing the Oracle case for its procedural treatment of the issues 
of independence). 
 119. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 120. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 121. Horsey, supra note 43, at 973 (1994) (citing Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 
406, 26 Eng. Rep. 643, 645 (Ch. 1742)). 
 122. Id. 
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The duty of care requires that directors inform themselves of all 
material information reasonably available before voting on a transaction.123  
To become informed, a board can retain consultants or other advisors and 
can be protected by relying on statements, information, and reports 
furnished by those advisors, if their reliance is in good faith and the 
advisors were selected with reasonable care.124 
The most significant duty of care case is the 1985 decision of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom.125  The Delaware Supreme Court held that the board of Trans 
Union had breached its duty of care in approving a merger.126  Trans 
Union’s Chairman and CEO, Van Gorkom, brought about the sale with the 
help of another inside director, Bruce Chelberg.127  The remainder of the 
board was not informed of the proposal until the day before the buyer’s 
deadline to accept it.128  The board approved the sale based on a twenty-
minute presentation by Van Gorkom, supported by Chelberg, as well as the 
advice of Trans Union’s legal counsel and the directors’ “knowledge of the 
market history of the Company’s stock.”129 
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that Trans Union’s board 
was not entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule because 
the board had failed to act on an informed basis.130  After finding that the 
Trans Union directors had breached their duty of care in approving the sale 
of the corporation, the Delaware Supreme Court took “the unprecedented 
step” of holding all of Trans Union’s directors jointly and severally liable 
for more than $23 million.131 
The Van Gorkom decision caused concern—some have called it 
panic—in the board rooms of Delaware corporations throughout the United 
States, because directors feared for their own personal liability.  In 1986, 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law was enacted 
by the Delaware Assembly.132  That enactment was in response to the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom and followed a 
directors’ insurance liability crisis.133 
 123. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 
(Del. Ch. 1971)). 
 124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2008); Grossman, supra note 33, at 402. 
 125. 488 A.2d 858; Grossman, supra note 33, at 402. 
 126. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. 
 127. Id. at 868. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 869. 
 130. Id. at 893. 
 131. Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 929, 935 (2008). 
 132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008) (enacted 1986). 
 133. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (“[A]s a matter of the 
public policy of this State, Section 102(b)(7) was adopted by the Delaware General 
Assembly in 1986 following a directors and officers insurance liability crisis and the 1985 
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The Delaware Supreme Court explained in Emerald Partners v. Berlin 
that: 
[t]he purpose of Section 102(b)(7) was to permit shareholders—
who are entitled to rely upon directors to discharge their fiduciary 
duties at all times—to adopt a provision in the certificate of 
incorporation to exculpate directors from any personal liability 
for the payment of monetary damages for breaches of their duty 
of care, but not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith 
violations and certain other conduct.134 
After section 102(b)(7) was enacted, the shareholders of almost all 
Delaware corporations approved charter amendments containing these 
exculpatory provisions with full knowledge of their import—that directors 
would not have to pay money damages for duty of care violations, i.e., 
gross negligence.135  “Since its enactment, Delaware courts have 
consistently held that the adoption of a charter provision, in accordance 
with section 102(b)(7), bars the recovery of monetary damages from 
directors for a successful shareholder claim that is based exclusively upon 
establishing a violation of the duty of care.”136 
In Malpiede v. Townson, the Delaware Supreme Court was asked to 
decide if a shareholder complaint that asserts only a due care claim is 
dismissible once the corporation’s section 102(b)(7) provision is properly 
invoked.137  The court’s answer was yes, even though a care violation 
would rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule and require the 
board to prove entire fairness.138 
The rationale of Malpiede constitutes judicial cognizance of a 
practical reality:  unless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the 
obligation to act in good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is 
unnecessary, because a section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director 
defendants from paying monetary damages if the failure to demonstrate 
entire fairness is exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of 
care.139  Since almost all Delaware corporations have adopted 102(b)(7) 
provisions, monetary damages cannot be recovered even if a violation of 
the duty of care is established.  “This has led several commentators to 
conclude that the fiduciary duty of care exists only as an aspirational and 
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”). 
 134. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 91. 
 137. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001). 
 138. Id. at 1094. 
 139. Id. at 1094-95; Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Del. 1999) 
(discussing the liability shield provided under the certificate of incorporation provision 
pursuant to 102(b)(7)). 
  
2009] FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND LOYALTY 693 
 
 
unenforceable standard,”140 except in actions for injunctive relief, or as a 
means for Delaware courts to “shame” directors who are grossly negligent 
and thereby inspire other directors not to repeat those same careless 
mistakes.141 
III.  COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING LOYALTY 
The effect of the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Malpiede is 
that the duty of care is no longer a litigation focus in actions for damages 
against the directors of Delaware corporations that have a section 102(b)(7) 
charter provision.  Instead, shareholders’ complaints now attempt to allege 
facts that, if true, constitute breaches of loyalty or good faith.  Let me give 
two examples that were explained in Malpiede. 
In Malpiede, the Supreme Court distinguished McMullin v. Beran.142  
In McMullin, the majority of a subsidiary’s board had ties to the parent 
corporation and was alleged to have influenced a hasty sale that was critical 
to the parent’s cash flow needs.143  The Supreme Court explained that the 
complaint in McMullin survived a motion to dismiss, even though the 
corporation had a 102(b)(7) provision, because the shareholder complaint 
in McMullin alleged facts that, if true, described a duty of care violation 
that could be attributed to the subsidiary board of directors’ divided 
loyalties.144 
The Malpiede decision also discussed complaints that alleged director 
violations of their duty of disclosure.145  The directors’ duty of disclosure is 
not an independent duty but the application in a specific context of the 
board’s fiduciary duties of care, good faith and loyalty.146  The duty of 
disclosure requires directors to fully and fairly disclose all material 
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.147  
In Malpiede, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Arnold 
v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc. that disclosure violations that are only 
attributable to a failure to exercise care are protected by 102(b)(7).148  
 140. Grossman, supra note 33, at 403. 
 141. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1811 (2001) (discussing the growing prevalence of opinions written to “shame” offenders). 
 142. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000). 
 143. Id. at 915-16. 
 144. Malpiede, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093. 
 145. Id. at 1085-89. 
 146. Id. at 1086 (citing Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 
1995)). 
 147. Id. (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84-85 (Del. 1992)); see also Grossman, 
supra note 33, at 408. 
 148. Malpiede, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086; Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 
1270, 1287 (Del. 1994); see also Grossman, supra note 33, at 408. 
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Therefore, unless a complaint relates a disclosure violation to a breach of 
loyalty, it will be dismissed after Malpiede. 
A. Care and Good Faith 
The holding in Malpiede explains why shareholder complaints have 
moved away from alleging care violations only and now focus on the duty 
of loyalty and good faith.  Once again, I will postpone my return to the duty 
of loyalty to briefly address directors’ fiduciary responsibility to act in 
good faith. 
In several cases in the 1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court began 
referring to directors’ fiduciary duties as a “triad”:  care, loyalty, and good 
faith.149  Those cases suggested or implied that good faith was an 
independent fiduciary duty.  Increasingly, shareholder-plaintiffs seeking 
monetary damages alleged that directors did not act in good faith because, 
like loyalty, it was another way to get around the exculpation of section 
102(b)(7) provisions. 
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation150 involved a controversy 
about “the hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz as Disney’s president.”151  In 
October 1995, Michael Ovitz and Disney entered into an employment 
agreement under which Ovitz would serve as Disney’s president for five 
years.152  Disney terminated Ovitz a little more than a year later in 
December 1996.153  Despite Ovitz’s short tenure, under the terms of the 
employment agreement he received a severance package valued at 
approximately $130 million.154 
In a derivative complaint, the shareholder-plaintiffs: 
alleged that the compensation committee of the Disney board, 
and the board itself, had failed to adequately consider the 
employment, compensation, and termination of Michael Ovitz as 
President of Disney in 1995-1996.  According to the complaint, 
the board and committee had considered Ovitz’s employment and 
compensation only briefly and had failed to act in his termination 
 149. See Bishop, supra note 51, at 742 (describing modern day fiduciary duties as the 
triad of good faith, care, and loyalty); see, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 
(Del. 2001) (“The directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary 
duties:  due care, loyalty, and good faith.” (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 
(1998))). 
 150. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 151. Kay Xixi Ng, Inside the Boardroom:  A Proposal to Delaware’s Good Faith 
Jurisprudence to Improve Board Passivity, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 393, 406 (2008). 
 152. Disney, 906 A.2d at 41. 
 153. Id. at 45-46. 
 154. Id. at 35; see also Ng, supra note 151, at 406 (describing Ovitz’s severance 
package). 
  




The Disney complaint used lack of good faith to rebut not only the 
presumptions of the business judgment rule, but also the application of a 
section 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provision.156  In denying a motion to 
dismiss the complaint, the Court of Chancery “held that the plaintiff had 
alleged sufficient facts to raise a ‘reason to doubt whether the board’s 
actions were taken honestly and in good faith,’ as required for the 
application of the business judgment rule,” and if those allegations were 
true, “the directors were not entitled to the protection of the exculpatory 
clause in Disney’s charter.”157 
When the trial in Disney concluded, “the Chancellor ruled in favor of 
the Board.”158  Nevertheless, the Disney case, like Van Gorkom, created 
“considerable consternation” with corporate board rooms because it 
permitted a claim of bad faith, i.e., lack of good faith, to survive a motion 
to dismiss and to go forward in a trial against the Disney directors.159 
In challenging the board actions that led to Ovitz’s brief but lucrative 
tenure at Disney, the plaintiffs contended that gross negligence (care) was 
on a continuum and that at some point, a board’s lack of care could become 
so egregious that it constituted bad faith.160  The Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected that contention and held that a failure to act in good faith requires 
conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the 
conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care (gross 
negligence).161 
In the Disney decision, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that 
from a legal standpoint, directors’ duties of care and good faith are 
distinct.162  The Court noted that Delaware’s legislative history and its 
common law jurisprudence draw clear distinctions between the duties to 
exercise due care and to act in good faith.163  It also noted that highly 
significant legal consequences result from that distinction.164 
In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the 
Delaware General Assembly had addressed the difference between bad 
faith and a failure to exercise due care in two separate statutory contexts.165  
 155. Dalley, supra note 108, at 27. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. 
Ch. 2003)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 28. 
 160. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64-65 (Del. 2006). 
 161. Id. at 66. 
 162. Id. at 65. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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“The first is Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL,”166 which has already been 
discussed.  As I have emphasized, that statute authorizes Delaware 
corporations, through a provision in the certificate of incorporation, to 
exculpate their directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the 
duty of care.167  Section 102(b)(7) has several exceptions, however, 
including most relevantly, “for acts or omissions not in good faith.”168  
Thus, as we know, a corporation can exculpate its directors from monetary 
liability for a breach of the duty of care, but not for conduct that is not in 
good faith. 
“A second legislative recognition of the distinction between fiduciary 
conduct that is grossly negligent and conduct that is not in good faith, is 
Delaware’s indemnification statute,” which is found in section 145 of the 
Delaware General Corporate Law.169  Under section 145, a director or 
officer of a corporation can be indemnified for liability (and litigation 
expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but not for a 
violation of the duty to act in good faith.170 
The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Disney provided important 
future guidance for directors of Delaware corporations by identifying three 
examples of conduct that would establish a failure to act in good faith:  
first, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of 
advancing the best interests of the corporation; second, where the fiduciary 
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law; and third, where the 
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his or her duties.171 
B. Loyalty and Good Faith 
In Shakespeare’s play King Henry VI, Part 2, the King asks, “O, 
where is faith? O, where is loyalty?”172  A few months after explaining the 
distinction between care and good faith in Disney, the Delaware Supreme 
Court addressed the relationship between the directors’ duty of loyalty and 
good faith.  In doing so, the Supreme Court answered the King’s question 
when it decided Stone v. Ritter.173  That clarification came in the context of 
deciding directors’ oversight responsibilities. 
 166. Disney, 906 A.2d at 65. 
 167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008). 
 168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2008). 
 169. Disney, 906 A.2d at 65; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2008). 
 170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145; see also Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 
211-13 (Del. 2005) (discussing the right to indemnification under section 145). 
 171. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67. 
 172. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 5, sc. 1. 
 173. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
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Stone was a derivative action.174  In 2004, AmSouth and AmSouth 
Bank paid $40 million in fines and $10 million in civil penalties to resolve 
regulatory and government investigations relating to the failure by bank 
employees to file suspicious activity reports that were required by the 
federal Bank Secrecy Act and several anti-money laundering regulations.175  
The complaint in Stone alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary 
duties by not properly discharging their oversight responsibilities.176 
The issue of directors’ fiduciary obligations in exercising oversight 
responsibility was initially addressed by the Court of Chancery over a 
decade earlier in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.177  
Because the Caremark case was not appealed, however, the subject had not 
been addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court.  In Caremark, the Court 
of Chancery held: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss 
is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within 
the corporation . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—
will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition 
to liability.178 
In Stone, consistent with its opinion Disney, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that Caremark articulates the two “necessary conditions for 
assessing director oversight liability”:179  (1) the directors utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls or (2) having 
implemented such a system or controls, the directors consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.180 
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “[w]here directors fail 
to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by 
failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”181  That holding 
required the Delaware Supreme Court “to clarify a doctrinal issue that was 
critical to understanding fiduciary liability” under the Caremark 
standard.182 
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that the terminology used in 
 174. Id. at 364. 
 175. Id. at 365. 
 176. Id. at 364. 
 177. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 178. Id. at 971. 
 179. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365. 
 180. Id. at 370. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 369. 
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Caremark and in Stone—which described the lack of good faith as a 
“necessary condition to liability”—was intentional.183  The purpose of that 
phraseology was “to communicate that a failure to act in good faith is not 
conduct that results . . . in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability.”184 
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court further explained that “[t]he 
failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to 
act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element,’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the 
fundamental duty of loyalty.’”185  Because a showing of bad faith conduct, 
as described in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director 
oversight liability, it followed that the fiduciary duty violated by that 
conduct is the duty of loyalty.186 
Stone’s explanation of what constitutes a failure to act in good faith 
resulted in two doctrinal consequences.187  The first consequence was that, 
“although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of 
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation 
to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that 
stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”188  Only 
directors’ violation of the latter two duties may directly result in liability, 
whereas a failure to act in good faith may result in liability, but 
indirectly.189 
The second doctrinal consequence was a recognition that “the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or 
other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.”190  The duty of loyalty also 
includes cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.191  The 
Delaware Supreme Court reiterated in Stone what the Court of Chancery 
had stated in Guttman v. Huang:  “A director cannot act loyally towards the 
corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in 
the corporation’s best interest.”192 
In Stone, the plaintiffs’ complaint equated a bad outcome with bad 
faith.193  The problem with the plaintiffs’ argument in Stone was “a failure 
to recognize that the directors’ good faith exercise of oversight 
responsibility may not invariably prevent employees from violating 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 
(Del. Ch. 2003)). 
 186. Id. at 370. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 192. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
 193. Id. at 373. 
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criminal laws, or from causing the corporation to incur significant financial 
liability.”194  In fact, both of these unfortunate acts had also occurred in 
Graham and Caremark.195 
You will recall that in the 1742 Sutton decision, the Lord Chancellor 
stated that “it is by no means just in a judge, after bad consequences have 
arisen from [any exercise of] power, to say [the fiduciary] foresaw at the 
time what [would] happen, and therefore [was] guilty of a breach of 
trust.”196 
In Stone in 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “in the 
absence of red flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be 
measured by the directors’ actions ‘to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exists’ and not by second-guessing after the occurrence of 
employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome.”197  The 
current financial crisis creates a perfect storm for examination by the 
Institute for Law and Economics with experts from the Law School, the 
Department of Economics, and the Wharton School.  Undoubtedly, that 
cross-disciplinary analysis will be looking for red flags that were missed 
from all three perspectives. 
The Stone decision brings us back to the duty of loyalty today.  After 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Stone and Disney, it is now 
clear that fiduciary misconduct that implicates the duty of loyalty includes 
not only “disloyalty in the classic sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-
interest of the fiduciary or of a related person to the interests of the 
corporation),”198 but also bad faith (i.e., “intentional dereliction of duty or 
conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities”199 or “fiduciary conduct 
motivated by actual intent to do harm” 200). 
The other Delaware cases I have discussed also lead to another 
conclusion.  The business judgment rule ensures that courts will respect the 
business decisions of directors unless the directors:  (1) were interested in 
the decision;201 (2) lacked independence to objectively evaluate the merits 
of the decision;202 (3) failed to act in good faith in making the decision;203 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 644 (Ch. 1742). 
 197. Stone, 911 A.2d at 373 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 
A.2d 959, 967-68, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 198. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
 199. Id. at 64. 
 200. Id. at 66. 
 201. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (holding that where 
the directors are interested in the transaction, they have the burden of showing utmost good 
faith and the fairness of the bargain). 
 202. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(holding that the Board’s special litigation committee failed the test of independence); 
Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that the HealthSouth board’s 
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or (4) otherwise acted in a manner not attributable to any rational business 
purpose or that constituted gross negligence.204 
Most corporations, however, have a charter provision, authorized 
under section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which 
eliminates or limits directors’ personal liability to the corporation and its 
stockholders for money damages for a breach of the fiduciary duty of 
care.205  Therefore, plaintiffs must allege and prove a breach of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty, which now includes the obligation of good faith, 
in order for the court to hold the directors personally liable.206  
Consequently, stockholder plaintiffs must bring an action premised on the 
theory that the director defendants “breached their duty of loyalty by 
engaging in intentional, bad faith, or self-interested conduct that is not 
immunized by the exculpatory charter provision” permitted by section 
102(b)(7).207 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As you can see from my remarks this afternoon, Professor Rock was 
exactly right in three respects.  First, Delaware fiduciary duty law is best 
understood as “a set of parables” about good and bad directors.208  Second, 
Delaware judicial opinions over time yield reasonably determinative, 
normative guidelines for directors.209  And third, therefore, Delaware’s 
fiduciary duty law is not mushy or blurred.210  In fact, with my remarks I 
have tried to suggest to you that the focus of Delaware’s fiduciary duty law 
is sharp and that focus is on loyalty. 
In the 1742 Sutton decision, the Lord Chancellor held that directors 
special litigation committee was not independent where committee members had a 
relationship with the insiders allegedly engaged in the wrongdoing). 
 203. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (requiring a good faith effort to 
ensure effective reporting systems are in place in the absence of red flags). 
 204. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (setting the applicable 
standard of care as gross negligence); see also In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 2008 WL 
4053221, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2008) (“[D]irectors' decisions will be respected by courts 
unless the directors . . . act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business 
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process . . . ."  (quoting Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000))). 
 205. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008). 
 206. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 (discussing the burden of the plaintiff in a derivative 
action). 
 207. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 495 (Del. Ch. 2000); see also 
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001) (explaining what the plaintiffs must 
plead in order to support a claim that is not barred by the 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision). 
 208. See Rock, supra note 8, at 1016 (discussing the Delaware opinions in the context of 
parables of good and bad managers in conjuction with good and bad lawyers). 
 209. See id. at 1017. 
 210. See id. at 1101. 
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had a fiduciary duty of fidelity.211  Fidelity is derived from the Latin word 
fidelis, meaning loyal or faithful.212 
Today is Veteran’s Day.  We honor the memory of the brave men and 
women who fought for our freedom.  In reflecting on Veteran’s Day, I was 
reminded of the motto of the United States Marine Corps:  Semper Fidelis, 
always loyal.  That is a good motto for the directors of Delaware 
corporations—always be loyal—and that is the moral of my story today. 
 
 211. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742). 
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